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"Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to bet-

ter." 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

1989 is an important year for the West Virginia Board of Regents

as it enters its twentieth year of existence and is subject to intense
scrutiny by the public, the state's legislature and experts in the field
of higher education. 2 This article critically analyzes the governance
structure3 of public higher education in West Virginia4 and proposes
an alternative statutory framework for the regulation and promotion
of higher education.
The following discussion will focus on the Board of Regents'
performance and on legislative and judicial developments in the field
of higher education in West Virginia during the past two decades.
It is hoped that this analysis and critique will provoke further
discussion about and prompt action toward the development of a
more appropriate statutory framework for the support of higher
education in the state.
To place West Virginia's higher education system in perspective,

it is helpful to survey other states' approaches to governance. 5
1. Johnson, OxFoRD DIcInONARY OF QUOTATIONS 255 (3d ed. 1985) (quoting R. Hooker, as
quoted by Johnson, as from Hooker, in the Preface to the ENoLSH IDICTIONARY).
2. The Carnegie Foundation, funded by the Sarah and Pauline Maier Foundation, will conduct
a study of West Virginia public higher education covering educational institutions' policies, missions,
and resources together with economic and political factors affecting higher education in the state.
The Carnegie Foundation, a private, nonprofit foundation that conducts policy studies and sponsors
educational research, set a target date of November 1988 for completion of the West Virginia study.
Governor's Press Office News Release, Mar. 20, 1988.
3. Governance in this context is a term of art which refers to external administrative governance
and means the statutory framework through which the state regulates and promotes higher education.
In West Virginia, the statutory framework for the governance of public institutions of higher education
is found primarily in Article 26 of Chapter 18 of the West Virginia Code. W. VA. CODE §§ 18-26I to -30 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
4. West Virginia institutions of public higher education governed by the Board of Regents are
West Virginia University, Marshall University, the College of Graduate Studies, West Virginia School
of Osteopathic Medicine, West Virginia State College, Bluefield State College, West Virginia Institute
of Technology, Fairmont State College, Shepherd College, Glenville State College, West Liberty State
College, Concord College, Potomac State College, Parkersburg Community College, Southern West
Virginia Community College, and West Virginia Northern Community College.
5. No attempt will be made to provide an in-depth discussion of this topic.
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II.

GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION-IN GENERAL

The administration of higher education in the United States has
gone through several distinct and significant changes since the first
colleges were founded in the colonies. 6 From colonial times until
the late 19th century, most colleges had lay governing boards and
enjoyed complete autonomy from the states. 7 Shortly after the establishment of the land grant colleges in 1862,8 many states centralized the administration of their public colleges and universities.'

In the 1940's and 1950's, some states relied on voluntary coordination among public institutions of higher education instead of a
central regulatory agency to administer higher education on a statewide basis. 10 In the 1950's there was an enormous growth in the
student population, and with the "expanding functions of higher

education,"'" individual institutional governing boards reappeared
and state-wide coordinating boards began to gain popularity.

2

The

reasons for this movement toward coordination have been succinctly
summarized as follows:
1) the desire for a comprehensive plan for higher education
services;

2) to reduce competition among public institutions for state
funds;
6. Harvard (1636), William & Mary (1693) and Yale (1701) were the first three colleges to be
established in the colonies. S. MARTORANA & E. HoLs, STATE BOARDS RESPONSILE FOR HIOHR
EDUCATION 10 (1960).
7. R. BERDAnL, STATE-WIDE COORDINATAON OF HIGHER EDUCATION 26 (1971).

8. The Morrill Act (also known as the First Morrill Act), 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-308 (1982), passed
July 2, 1862, granted to each state 30,000 acres of public land for each Senator and each Congressman
to which the state was entitled under the 1860 census. If not enough public land were available, the
federal government would issue scrip; either land or scrip were to be sold by the state and the proceeds
reinvested, with interest tobe used for support of at least one college emphasizing "agriculture and
the mechanic arts. . . ." Id. § 304. No funds could be used for purchase or maintenance of any
buildings. Id. § 305. Any territory that became a state after passage of the Act could participate in
the land grant by accepting the Act's provisions within three years of statehood and by establishing
at least one agricultural and mechanical college within five years of acceptance of the grant. Id. Land
grant colleges tended to develop as autonomous institutions, similar to private colleges, rather than
as a part of a state-wide higher education network. S. MARTORANA AND E. HOLS, supra note 6, at
11.
9. R. BERnDuL, supra note 7, at 26.

10. Id.
11. S. MARToRANA & E. Horus, supra note 6, at 26.
12. R. BERtum, supra note 7, at 26.
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3) to control the proliferation of degree programs;
4) to eliminate or reduce "intensive lobbying" and "bitter political rivalries" among competing institutions and their constituencies in the establishment of branch campuses and in the
13
recruitment of students.
The need for some form of state-wide coordination of higher
education is no longer seriously disputed.14 Virtually every state at,13. J. MILr, CONFLICT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 26 (1984). At least two other commentators
also noted the trend in many states during this time to reorganize state government. R. BERDArL,
supra note 7, at 29; Lyman A. Glenny was particularly suspicious of the trend, noting:
There exists a strong, fairly rapid trend toward the establishment of some kind of agency
to coordinate publicly supported colleges and universities in many states. The movement
toward reorganization and consolidation of state governments has strongly influenced this
trend. There are many reasons for the establishment of central agencies of coordination,
but the most important has been the wish to economize. The needs of higher education
will be better served when the legislation establishing agencies and the agencies themselves
place a .greater emphasis on the more positive objectives.
S. MARTORANA & E. HoLUs, supra note 6, at 10 (quoting L. GLENNY, AUTONOMY OF PUBLIC COLLEGES:
THE CHALLENGE OF COORDINATION 26 (1959)).
14. In an early report on the expansion of state supervision of higher education, the Committee
on Government and Higher Education found that many educators were watching "with anxiety" the
growth of these "super boards" or "master boards." The Efficiency of Freedom 20, CoMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION (1959). The essay reported two problems which may have
accounted for some of this anxiety. The first concerns
[w]hether the master board can perform the task of co-ordination without intruding in
matters that lie properly within the jurisdiction of the governing boards of individual institutions. The second concerns the possibility that a co-ordinating agency may have a leveling move toward an average standard. Where this occurs, the best colleges and universities
are pulled down while the worst are lifted up, and thus valuable models of excellence may
be sacrificed to standards of uniformity.
Id. at 21. Serious questions about the appropriate structure for achieving coordination and about the
extent of the coordinating agencies' authority do, however, still exist. "The real issue with respect
to autonomy. . is not whether there will be interference by the state but rather whether the inevitable
interference will be confined to the proper topics and expressed through a suitable sensitive mechanism." R. BEnAnBn, supra note 7, at 9.
In its 1971 report, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education recognized the need for
effective state-wide coordination of higher education, but recommended against "investing coordinating agencies with administrative authority, particularly over budget matters." The Capitol and the
Campus 28-29 (Carnegie Comm'n on Higher Educ.) (1971). Five years later, the Carnegie Council
on Policy Studies in Higher Education issued an even more critical view of this trend:
[We regret the tendency toward centralization of authority over higher education because:
- it reduces the influence and sense of responsibility of students, faculty members,
campus administrators, and members of campus governing boards-all persons who
know the most about the institution and are most directly involved in its operations.
- this concentration seems to have had no measurable direct impact on policies or
practices.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss1/2
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tempts, in some fashion, to coordinate efforts and funding that support higher education.' 5 All public institutions of higher education
are subject to some form of state involvement. This involvement
can vary from a voluntary association of institutional governing
boards 6 to state-wide consolidated governance for all public colleges
and universities. 17 The legal basis for a state's involvement in public
higher education is typically statutory or constitutional.18
There are several types of administrative agencies through which
state-wide coordination is effected. A simple but useful categorization of such agencies classifies them according to their statutory
authority and function as either 1) state-wide governing boards, 2)
state-wide coordinating boards, or 3) state-wide advisory boards. 19
One recent national study of higher education indicates that
twenty-three states have state-wide governing boards, twenty-three
- the governance processes worsen, becoming more costly, cumbersome, time-consuming, and frustrating.
THE CARNEGIE CoUNCIL OF POLICY STuDIEs IN HIGHER EDUCATION, THE STATES AND HIGHER EDUCATION: A PROUD PAST AND A VITAL FUTURE 79 (1980).

15. A. McGuINNEss, STATE POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION STRUcTUREs HANDBOOK 1988 (1987).
16. In a voluntary association, members representing each institution work together to further
each others' goals, commonly preparing a joint budget request to the state legislature, but the association has no legal power to enforce policy and budget decisions or to control the overall direction
of state higher education or the expenditure of appropriations to each member institution. M. Moos
& F.E. ROURKE, THE CA~Nius AND THE STATE 207-09 (1959). California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, and Nebraska had voluntary associations at the time of Moos' and Rourke's study but have
since changed their systems of governance.
17. A consolidated governing board has centralized responsibility for both day-to-day operations
and long-range planning functions, in a system "with no local or segmental governing bodies." R.
BERDAHL, supra note 7, at 19. The West Virginia Board of Regents is the consolidated governing
board for public colleges and universities in West Virginia.
18. Some states' constitutions create constitutionally autonomous universities which are the
functional equivalents of a "fourth branch of government." L.A. GLENY & T.K. DALGLISH, PUBLIC
UNIVERSITIES, STATE AGENCIES; AND THE LAW 15 (1973). See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. X, § 9; CAL.
CONST. art. IX, § 9.
Other state constitutions grant the legislature the specific authority to establish and regulate
public colleges and universities. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 11, §§ 4, 7; COLO. CONST. art. VIII, §
5; IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 10 (but legislative control, limited to accounting and funding matters, must
not interfere with constitutional grant of supervisory authority to the board of regents. State ex rel.
Black v. State Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921)).
In other states, the higher education governance structures are creatures of statute-created by
the legislature and subject to legislative whim. See e.g., MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101, 12-105
(1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, paras. 22; 301, 307, 308; 322; 502b; 651; 802b; 1001, 1008 (SmithHurd 1986).
19. See J. MILLET, supra note 13, at 99.
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states have coordinating boards, and four states have neither a co-

ordinating nor a governing board but rather have a unique form of
governance which fits neither classification. 20 A brief summary of
the advantages and disadvantages of each of these forms of governance follows. 21
A.

22
State-Wide Governing Boards

The primary advantage of the state-wide or consolidated gov-

erning board is that it typically has been granted broad statutory
23
authority to govern the individual institutions within the "system."
This authority generally extends to the selection and appointment
of the chief executive officer for each institution2 and to the establishment of the operating and capital improvement budget of the

campuses. 25 Smaller institutions which are a part of a consolidated
governing board often claim that central governing boards are more
efficient. 26 Some argue that the consolidated governing board is the
only form of governance through which implementation of statewide planning can be achieved because the governing board has not
only the authority to coordinate but also has the power to govern. 27
Finally, legislatures in states with consolidated governing boards are
20. EDUCATION CoMMssIoN OF THE STATES, STATE POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION STRUCTURES
HANDBOOK 5 (1988). The states which have a state-wide governing board are Alaska, Ga., Haw.,
Idaho, Me., Mass., Mont., Nev., N.D., R.I., S.D., Utah, W. Va., Ariz., Fla., Iowa, Kan., Miss.,
N.H., N.C., Or., Wyo., and Wis. The states of Del., Mich., Neb., and Vt. have higher education
planning agencies with limited authority more akin to state-wide advisory boards.
21. A more detailed discussion and analysis of the merits and demerits of these forms of governance is both beyond the scope of this article and beyond the expertise of the author; numerous
scholarly works which more than adequately accomplish this task are available for the serious student
of the governance of higher education. See, e.g., R. BERDAmL, supra note 7. This article will focus
on the efficacy of these various structures for the governance of higher education in West Virginia.
22. "State-wide governing boards" supervise all of a state's public institutions of higher education through a centralized administration. State statutes may vary in their definition of public
education, however. In some cases the governing board supervises only senior colleges, but in others
the governing board has jurisdiction over junior and community colleges also.
23. J. MILLET, supra note 13, at 104. Consider also, however, the impact of the legislature's
authority over appropriations; "the authority of a state-wide governing board is not so impressive
in fact as it may appear in law." Id. at 104-05.
24. Id. at 105.
25. Id.
26. M. Moos & F. RoURaE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE 211 (1959).
27. R. BERDU
M, supra note 7, at 84-85.
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more likely to make lump-sum appropriations when there is a central
state agency governing higher education.2 8
Overcentralization and the leveling effect caused by the centralization of functions are the most commonly noted disadvantages
of state-wide governing boards. 29 Other observed weaknesses include:
the vulnerability to political influence and pressures;30 inadequate

performance in the planning role; 3' and the regionalism and sectionalism which may beset the board.3 2 Finally, some experts in the
field find the combined coordination and governance functions to

33
be distinct and incompatible.

B.

34
State-Wide CoordinatingBoards

The primary advantage of a state-wide coordinating board is that
it allows individual governing boards to tend to the management of
their institutions while the state-wide coordinating board employs
its comprehensive authority to coordinate the operations of the various institutions under its purview. The coordinating board can exercise its authority without direct responsibility for the administration
of any particular institution.3 5 State-wide coordinating boards are

28. J. M=LET, supra note 13, at 106.
29. See R. BERDA-L, supra note 7, at 30; J. Mni.nr, supra note 13, at 111. See also THE
CARNEGIE COtWiESSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE CAPrroL AND Tm CAMPUS: STATE REsPONSITrY
FOR POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 27 (1971).
The Commission believes that creation of single governing boards or establishment of coordinating agencies with administrative responsibilities results in centralized detailed control
layering of authority, means that similar processes are carried out at successive layers, and
each decision affecting the operation of an institution takes longer and is more remote from
the functioning level.
30. J. MILUET, supra note 13, at 109.
31. Id. at 111. In discussing the performance of the single board's planning function Louis
Mayhew noted, "[a] single board can develop monopolistic tendencies so that no real look to the
future is possible for fear of jeopardizing the status quo." R. Ba.DAHL, supra note 7, at 84 (quoting
L. MAYHEW, LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 59 (1969)).
32. 1 \VEST VmIA CoMM. ON HIGHER EDUC., REPORT TO THE HONORABLE HuLETr C. SMTH
AND Ta LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF 'WEST VIRGINIA 26 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Comm. REPORT].
33. Id.
34. "State-wide coordinating boards" exercise no direct governance authority; rather, they may
draft a master plan for state higher education; approve degree programs; review and recommend state
budget appropriations for individual institutions; in many states they may approve new branch campuses and off-campus teaching by existing institutions.
35. J. Mn-Er, supra note 13, at 112-13, 114; R. BERDArm,supra note 7, at 32.
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commonly perceived as being motivated by the interests of the state,
not of an individual institution, and these boards usually recruit
independent professional staff members.3 6
The several disadvantages of state-wide coordinating boards are
generally political in nature. Coordinating boards are typically vulnerable to criticism both from the institutions they coordinate and
from the state government of which they are a part; 7 they lack a
political constituency; 38 and they often have an "uncertain relationship to the legislative and executive branches."" State-wide boards
often have little or no control over the chief executives of the campuses they coordinate. As a consequence, some boards find that the
individual institutions are too independent and are unwilling to make
40
the compromises sometimes necessary to achieve coordination.
Finally, many coordinating boards perform poorly in the execution of their academic planning responsibilities either because they
were given inadequate authority to implement their planning responsibilities or because they have inadequate staff and time to de41
vote to their planning responsibilities.
42
C. State-Wide Advisory Boards

It is difficult to generalize about the advantages and disadvantages of advisory boards because their performance and success are,
more than in the case of the two agencies discussed above, dependent
to a large degree on "[their] objectivity and persuasive reasoning,
36. J. MILLET, supra note 13, at 113. See also A. BRUMBAUGH, STATE-WIDE PLANNING AND
COORDINATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 31 (1963) (citing L. GLENNY, AUTONOMY OF PUBLIC COLLEGES:
THE CHALLENGE OF COORDINATION (1959)).
37. R. BEIWAHi, supra note 7, at 32.
38. Id.
39. J. MILLET, supra note 13, at 113.
40. Id.at 118.
41. Id. at 115-16.
42. An "advisory board" in Millet's scheme has the least authority of any higher education
governance structure. Like the coordinating board, "the advisory board may prepare a master plan
and may review program offerings and budget requests, but [it] does not have the authority to approve
degree programs or to recommend operating and capital appropriations." Id. at 101. An advisory
board may review branch campuses and off-campus instruction but usually cannot review their establishment.
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not upon [their] authority to act." ' 43 Generally, however, advisory
boards are non-threatening to institutional governing boards and to
institutional executives and can serve effectively as a central body
44
for the administration of certain higher education programs.
The disadvantages of advisory boards are fairly apparent. Advisory boards often do not adequately address legitimate state concerns; they lack authority to require action; they generally must wait
for legislative or gubernatorial direction prior to initiating plans and
studies; and they also have an uncertain relationship with the executive and legislative branches .4
No one form of governance is ideal. Systems which operate successfully in one state may be entirely unsuited for another state. It
is only when an individual state's political and historical background
is carefully analyzed that one form of governance is preferable to
the others.
III.

TnE

OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN
WEST VRGI-'A-"A BUMPY HISTORY" 46
GOVERNANCE

This section briefly surveys the history of governance of higher
education in West Virginia from 1863 to 1969 and describes the
political and legal environments in which the West Virginia Board
of Regents was established. 47
Unlike the state from which it was formed in 1863, West Virginia
48
initially had no state-supported institutions of higher education.
The Agricultural College of West Virginia was established as the

43. J.MILLET, supra note 13, at 123.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. In describing the state of higher education in West Virginia, a leading expert in the field
described the history of governance in West Virginia as "bumpy." M. CHAMBERS, HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE FUTY STATES 399 (1970).

47. For additional and more detailed information on the history of governance in West Virginia,
see Machesney, The Development of HigherEducation Governance and Coordination in West Virginia
(1971) (unpublished manuscript available in Evansdale Library, West Virginia University). See also,
Jackameit, The Political, Social, and Economic Factors in the Shaping of the Structure of Public
HigherEducation in West Virginia:A History 1863-1969 (June 1973) (unpublished manuscript available
in Evansdale Library, West Virginia University).
48. Jackameit, supra note 47, at 64.
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state's land-grant institution in 1867. 49 This college was governed by
an eleven person Board of Visitors who were initially appointed by
the Governor.50 In 1868 the college was renamed West Virginia University, and the name of its governing body was changed to the
Board of Regents . 5 There were many changes in the administration
of higher education in the thirty years which followed. Most of these
changes were designed to permit one political party to gain or regain
control of the Regents.5 2 By 1901, there were six separate governing
boards, each with the statutory authority to manage and control an
institution. 53
The first of several significant attempts at consolidation occurred
in 1909 when the Legislature abolished the six separate governing
boards and replaced them with a single State Board of Regents and
the State Board of Control.4 The State Board of Regents was responsible for the administration of the educational affairs of all of
the state institutions; the State Board of Control had "charge and
control of the financial and business affairs" of the public insti55
tutions .
In 1919, in a move intended to further consolidate public education in West Virginia, the Legislature abolished the Board of
Regents and created a new State Board of Education which had the
control and management responsibilities for all aspects of public
education, including post-secondary public education. 6 The State
Board of Control's authority over the financial and business affairs
of these public institutions remained unaffected.
In 1927, after several years of political struggles involving the
president of West Virginia University and the State Board of Ed-

49. Id. at 43.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 44.

52. Id. at 44-46.
53. Machesney, supra note 47, at 35.
54. Act of Feb. 22, 1909, ch. 58, 1909 W. Va. Acts 452.
55. Id.

56. Act of Feb. 21, 1919, ch. 2, 1919 W. Va. Acts 39. As an economy measure in 1932, there
was an attempt to abolish the State Board of Education and transfer its duties to the Board of Public
Works. This action was struck down on a constitutional technicality by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Moats v. Cook, 113 W. Va. 151, 167 S.E. 137 (1932).
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ucation, the Legislature created a separate Board of Governors for
the University. 7 Members of this seven person institutional govern-

ing board were appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation
by the Senate.58 Thus, the administration of public higher education
was accomplished through a State Board of Education, a Board of

Governors for West Virginia University, and the State Board of
Control.
This modest first step toward decentralization was quickly crit-

icized by the State Board of Education as an "undesirable and complicating factor in the educational system of the state;" not
surprisingly, the State Board recommended that it be given the au59
thority of the three existing boards.
Dissatisfaction with this somewhat decentralized administrative
structure grew during the next decade.6 0 A bill introduced in 1935

proposed consolidation of all governing boards into one Board of
Ijigher Education. The proposal failed on a close vote. 6 ' It was in

this politically turbulent environment that the Strayer Report, commissioned in 1945 by an interim committee of the Legislature, concluded that:
[w]hile there is a certain appealing logic . . . in the argument for the creation
of a central administrative board for the general control of all matters relating
to public education-elementary, secondary, and higher, it is the present contention that the University is not just another state institution. It is fundamentally
different and must always be different if it is to serve its full purposes. The best

57. Act of Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 13, 1927 W. Va. Acts 16. Reports of events leading to the
creation of WVU's separate Board of Governors contain several references to an apparently heated
and wide-spread dispute between WVU and the State Board of Education over the Board's direction
that WVU join the West Virginia Athletic conference. See Jackameit, supra note 47, at 84; Machesney,
supra note 47, at 55-56.
58. See Jackameit, supra note 47, at 84; Act of Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 13, 1927 W. Va. Acts 16.
59. State Dept. of Educ., 1928 Survey of Education in West Virginia, quoted in J. Machesney,
supra note 47, at 59. For a fairly lengthy discussion of the survey and its conclusions, see Jackameit,
supra note 47, at 98-105. Jackameit concludes that the "[i]mpact of the 1928 Survey of Education
in West Virginia was slight as regards the development of higher education, the study being most
notable perhaps for those major recommendations which were not implemented." Id. at 109.
60. At the same time that the administration of higher education in West Virginia was being
criticized, many other public institutions in West Virginia were facing serious political interference
from the governor. See Machesney, supra note 47, 60-66; Jackameit, supra note 47, at 110-48 for
full accounts of the political machinations of the 1930's and 1940's.
61. Machesney, supra note 47, at 67.
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interests of the University will, it is believed, be conserved by the continuance
2
of a separate Board of Governors.

The report further found that "[t]here is no justification for the
present dual system of governing boards, one having charge of the
business affairs and the other concerned with the academic program. "63
Two years later, the Legislature adopted this recommendation of
the Strayer Report by eliminating the Board of Control's authority

over the financial affairs of the state's colleges. 64 Thus, the administration of higher education was reconsolidated with two separate
governing boards, each responsible for the academic and financial
6
affairs of its constituents. 1
At the end of World War II, enrollment in West Virginia's public
institutions increased dramatically, thereby placing new demands on
the system. The Legislature once again commissioned a study of
higher education. The results of this study were released in the 1956
Brewton Report which concluded that:
[t]he existence of two state boards that have independent responsibility under
almost identical statutes for governing and coordinating two separate programs
of higher education inevitably leads to wasteful duplication, unwarranted competition, institutional "empire building," and the imprudent use of political pressure groups. Economical and efficient operation of a system of higher education

62. Jackameit, supra note 47, at 136 (quoting 0. STRAYER, A REPORT OF A SURVEY OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 740-41 (1945)).

63. Id. at 48. Voters rejected proposed amendments to the Constitution which would have
implemented recommended reforms. See Jackameit, supra note 47, at 137.
64. Act of Feb. 18, 1947, ch. 88, 1947 W. Va. Acts 318; Act of Feb. 18, 1947, ch. 89, 1947
W. Va. Acts 320. The Legislature also placed financial control of WVU with the Board of Governors,
changed the membership of the State Board of Education and Board of Governors of WVU, and
limited the Governor's power to remove board members from office. Act of Mar. 7, 1947, ch. 72,
1947 W. Va. Acts 277; Act of Feb. 20, 1947, ch. 73, 1947 W. Va. Acts 281.
65. Despite the legal independence of these governing boards, the Board of Public Works, the
Director of the Budget and the State Auditor all exerted considerable influence over the educational
affairs of the public colleges and universities. See Machesney, supra note 47, at 86-87 (quoting J.
BREWTON, PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN XVEST VIRGINIA, A SURVEY 49 (1956)). See also Jackameit,
supra note 47, at 149-56; State ex rel. Bd. of Governors v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 239, 55 S.E.2d 505
(1949); State ex rel. Bd. of Governors v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 428, 59 S.E.2d 705 (1950); State ex rel.
Bd. of Governors v. Sims, 136 W. Va. 789, 68 S.E.2d 489 (1952); State ex rel. Bd. of Governors
v. Sims, 140 W. Va. 64, 82 S.E.2d 321 (1954); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Sims, 139 W. Va. 802,
81 S.E.2d 665 (1954); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Sims, 143 W. Va. 269, 101 S.E.2d 190 (1957).
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can be achieved only under the direction of a single board invested with the
6
authority necessary to discharge creditably the duties assigned to it. 6

The recommendations of the Brewton Report were reflected in
proposed legislation but were not enacted in the 1957 session of the
Legislature. Following the unsuccessful efforts to consolidate the
governance of higher education into one central body, the Legislature set out to promote voluntary coordination between the State
Board of Education and the Board of Governors. 67
In 1961, pursuant to a resolution of the Legislature, the Governor
appointed a Committee on Higher Education to "make specific recommendations" for higher education. 68 The Committee recommended a voluntary form of coordination through the creation of
a Commission on Higher Education to
1) study continuously all aspects of the State's total higher education program,
and from time to time make recommendations with the purpose of achieving
maximum coordination of that program, eliminating unnecessary duplication, and
providing the highest quality programs at the most economical cost; 2) . . .make
recommendations concerning the budget requests of the respective governing boards
and the institutions of higher education under their jurisdiction . . .;and 3)
prepar[e] a priority list for new construction and for major renovations to existing
facilities at the several state colleges and universities. 69

The Committee further recommended that the Board of Governors of West Virginia University and the West Virginia Board of
Education be retained with the provision that the West Virginia Board
of Education "proceed with deliberate haste (1) to develop a workable plan for separation of its functions pertaining to higher education from its other functions, and (2) to propose legislation to
70
effect such a plan."
Once again the stage was set for a significant reform in the state's
administration of higher education, but the legislation implementing
66. Jackameit, supra note 47, at 87-88 (quoting J.

BREWTON, PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN

WEST VIRGINIA, A SuRVEY 56 (1956)).

67. See Machesney, supra note 47, at 90. The two boards met periodically as the Joint Committee of the Board of Governors of West Virginia University and the West Virginia Board of Education. Id. at 90-98.
68. H. Con. Res. 50, Reg. Sess., 1961 W. Va. Acts 913.

69. WEST VIRGINIA GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON HIGHER EDUC., A STRUCTURE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN WEST VIRGINIA 4 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 CoMM. REPORT].
70. Id. at 5.
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the Committee's recommendations died in the House and Senate
committees .71

It was against this backdrop of several unsuccessful attempts to
bring about significant change in the governance of higher education
that the West Virginia Committee on Higher Education was appointed by the Governor in 1965.72 As the Committee itself noted,
"[u]nlike many past studies and reports on higher education conducted by experts from beyond the borders of the State, this report
represents the considered judgment of those most intimately and

actively engaged in the day-to-day government and administration
'73
of West Virginia's complex of higher education.

The Committee on Higher Education concluded its report with

five recommendations:
(1) establish an eleven member- West Virginia Board of Regents with carefully
limited authority to study higher education (public and private) in West Virginia,
to coordinate and allocate the functions among the state colleges and universities,
and to allocate all federal funding programs.
(2) establish a Board of Governors of the State colleges to assume the responsibility of the State Board of Education for the governance of the eight state
colleges.
(3) establish a Board of Governors of Marshall University to act as its governing
body.
(4) retain the Board of Governors of West Virginia University.
(5) retain the West Virginia Board of Education leaving its supervisory powers
over the free school system intact."

These recommendations were based on the Committee's conclusion that some form of state-wide coordination of higher education
was inevitable. 76 The Committee surveyed the coordination efforts

71. Machesney, supra note 47, at 99.
72. H. Con. Res. 51, Reg. Sess., 1965 W. Va. Acts 640.
73. 1966 Comm. REPoRT, supra note 32, at 9.
74. The eleven members would be the presidents of the West Virginia Board of Education, the
Board of Governors of West Virginia University, the Board of Governors of Marshall University,
the Board of Governors of the State colleges; two gubernatorial appointees who are members of
governing boards of two private colleges; and five gubernatorial appointees from the public at large.
Id.at 20-21.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 23.
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and experiences of other states to reach the conclusion that a Board
of Regents with carefully defined power offered "the full opportunity to provide reasonable coordination, and at the same time
preserve the maximum freedom of initiative on the part of each
' 77
institution and its governing board.
Legislation to implement the Committee's recommendations was
introduced in the 1967 legislative session but was not enacted. 78 In
1968 there was another attempt by the Legislature to radically restructure the governance structure by creating a single state board
of education; this attempt at reorganization was also unsuccessful. 79
Once again, in 1969, legislation was introduced in the House
which would establish a multiple governing board-coordinating board
structure much like that which was recommended by the West Virginia Commission on Higher Education several years before. 80 This
bill was hailed as "one of the most controversial pieces of legislation
ever proposed in the West Virginia legislature."" Despite the controversial nature of the proposed reform, support for the multiple
governing board-coordinating board concept was widespread among
the college and university presidents, professional educators, experts
in higher education and among the legislators, including the Speaker
of the House. One of the few voices raised in opposition to the
coordinating board concept was the president of West Virginia University, who spoke against the concept during a legislative hearing
82
on reorganization of higher education.
As alternatives to the reorganization plan initially proposed, the
president suggested that:

77. Id. at 24. The committee rejected the popular suggestion of one board for all of higher
education, calling it "a natural but a deceptively simple answer to the complex problems of higher

education." Id. at 25.
78. Machesney, supra note 47, at 103-04.

79. Id. at 108.
80. This bill would have also established a West Virginia Education Council to coordinate
educational efforts of the elementary and secondary schools and the institutions of higher education.
Machesney, supra note 47, at 110. A second bill to establish a single governing board was also

introduced in the House a month later.
81. Dominion News, Feb. 4, 1969, at p. 1-B, col. 4.
82. Charleston Gazette, Feb. 5, 1969, at p. 1, col. 2.
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(1) [T]he Joint Committee of the Board of Governors and the State Board of
Education make whatever changes in higher education the Legislature felt necessary ...
(2) The Legislature should set up a new board to assume the State Board of

Education's responsibilities in higher education.
(3) [A] single board of regents to govern all public institutions of higher education
[be created]."

Shortly after these alternatives were suggested, the momentum which
appeared to have been carrying the coordinating board concept to
sure passage suddenly shifted, and the Legislature's attention was
turned to the creation of a single consolidated governing board, the
third alternative suggested by the president of West Virginia University.
Ignoring the advice of the "experts" and responding to some
last minute political maneuvering within a week of its proposal, the
House Education Committee recommended passage of a bill to establish the West Virginia Board of Regents as the single consolidated
governing board for all public institutions of higher education. s4 The
House of Delegates passed this bill without discussion even though
the same proposal just one year before had provoked fierce opposition and intense debate. The Senate quickly passed the bill with
minor amendments.8 6 Thus, with very little opportunity for a reexamination and close analysis of the proposed reforms and with
virtually no discussion, the Legislature enacted "a bill that call[ed]
for the most sweeping changes in the administration of education
87
in the state's history."
Newspaper accounts of the passage of this "sweeping change"
suggest that the Legislature believed it had finally found a workable,
albeit imperfect, solution to the higher education governance dilemma which had haunted the state for so long.
Because there was no formal debate or discussion of the single
governing board proposal before its passage in 1969, it is particularly

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Machesney, supra note 47, at 113.
Charleston Gazette, Feb. 19, 1969, at p. 1, col. 2.
Act of Mar. 3, 1969, ch. 130, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1142.
Charleston Daily Mail, Mar. 3, 1969, at p. 1, col. 7.
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difficult to discern the legislative intent in adopting the consolidated
governing board approach over the coordinating board concept. In
1979, the Academy for Educational Development reviewed "available relevant documents" and interviewed legislators and institutional personnel in an attempt to discern the legislative intent in
creating the Board of Regents.8 8 Based on its review of the legislation
creating the Board of Regents, the Academy concluded that the Legislature's initial concerns were:
-

to insulate the Legislature from institutional lobbying;

to fix operational and budgetary responsibility for higher education with one
entity; and,
-

-

to promote state-wide planning designed to increase efficiency."

9

What is not apparent from the "legislative history" of the 1969
educational reform bill is why the single governing board approach
was chosen over the coordinating board approach to address these
legislative concerns. The Legislature adopted the single board proposal contrary to the recommendations of its consultant and at a
time when the growing trend in the United States was toward the
coordinating board approach. Despite the fact that the widely-accepted recommendations of the Governor's Commission on Higher
Education had unequivocally rejected the single board concept, there
was no formal or recorded attempt to discredit these recommendations. The recommendations were merely ignored once the momentum for the single board concept grew. The relative ease with
which the Legislature was able to adopt this radical reform in the
governance of higher education suggests just how acute the governance problem had become. In retrospect, it appears clear that
the Legislature was simply desperate to take action to address the
"recurring, unanswered questions as to the appropriate state-level
structure for public higher education which had harassed it for decades." 9 0

88. ACADEMY FOR EDUC. DEV., INC., SUPPORT, PERuOa.tOANCE AND PROTEcnON OF HIGHmR
EDuCATIoN IN \VEST VIRGIA 113 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 AED REPORT].
89. Id.at 14.
90. M. CHAMBERS, supra note 46, at 401. The history of governance of higher education in

West Virginia looks even "bumpier" when it is compared to the history of governance throughout
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It was in this environment-and in light of this "bumpy history"-that the West Virginia Board of Regents was created to reform the system of higher education in West Virginia.
The following sections of this article discuss the performance of
the Board of Regents in meeting its statutory obligations and the
original legislative intent.
IV. Two DECADES OF GOVERNANCE BY THE BOR
In the past twenty years, there have been two distinct phases in
the governance of higher education in West Virginia. The first phase
was a period of laissez-faire. It lasted through the end of the first
decade of governance by the Board of Regents. This period saw the
development of both internal and external policies and procedures,
evidence that the Board's principal concern was gaining control of
its constituent institutions. There was little, if any, legislative or
judicial interference in the Board's activities during this early phase.
Evaluations of the Board's performance were perfunctory and generally favorable. 9'
After a decade of governance under the Board of Regents, criticism of the Board's performance became more direct. The Board
was criticized for its failure to meet its statutory responsibilities 92
and for its failure to provide leadership in the development of educational policy. The Board's lack of action created a vacuum into
which the court and the Legislature intervened, and the administration of higher education shifted from the laissez-faire period into
the interventionist period.
A.

The Laissez-Faire Period
The original Board of Regents enabling legislation did not specifically enumerate its duties. Instead, the Legislature's mandate was
the rest of the United States. Other states' governance structures gradually evolved from separate,
lay boards, to single governing board, to coordinating boards; West Virginia's structure never evolved
beyond the single governing board stage. Instead of evolving, the governance structure in West Virginia
has developed in "fits and starts" with several detours and some backtracking.
91. Legislative Auditor's Office, Performance Audit of West Virginia Board of Regents (1984)
(available from the author upon request).
92. The 1979 AED REPORT, supra note 88, noted those areas in which the BOR had failed to
fulfill its statutorily prescribed role.
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broad; it provided that the "determination, control, supervision and
management of the financial, business and educational policies and
affairs of all state colleges and universities shall be under the control,
supervision and management of the board." 93 The Board was also
charged with the responsibility to meet the higher education needs
of the state, to avoid unnecessary duplication, and to submit budget
requests on behalf of the various colleges and universities. 94 While
the Board's statutory duties were initially quite general, it was given
virtually unlimited authority to. execute its authority. 95 Given the
political climate and in light of the Legislature's determination to
promote reform and efficiency in higher education by centralizing
the operational, budgetary and state-wide planning responsibilities
in one entity with full and plenary powers, one might reasonably
have expected that the new Board would aggressively and expeditiously seize the initiative, immediately providing leadership in the
development and implementation of state-wide policies to meet the
needs of higher education.
Instead of doing so, the Board initially concentrated on the implementation of a rigid operational structure which emphasized a
highly structured system of centralized decision-making with many
checkpoints and levels of review. This control-oriented structure was
criticized both by the institutions subject to it96 and by experts in
the field of educational administration. 97 While concentrating on the
93. Act of Mar. 3, 1969, ch. 130, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1142, 1149 (as codified in W. VA. CODE
§ 18-26-8) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
94. Id.
95. The absence of a specific enumeration of detailed duties and responsibilities is not unusual.
It has been observed that:
The statutes and constitutional provisions by which boards classified as governing or coordinating. . .have been created are usually phrased in language that clearly designates their
authority and duty to govern or coordinate. . . .On the other hand, the legally stated
responsibilities of the governing-coordinating boards rarely include the full extent of the
areas in which they exercise actual responsibility.
S. MARTORANA & E. Horns, supra note 6, at 22.

96. As early as 1973, an ad hoc committee appointed by the West Virginia University Senate
Executive Committee criticized the Board of Regents for its "apparent decision to function as an
administrative agency that tightly controlled and operated the institutions on almost a day-to-day basis
in a nondifferentiating pattern through a very small administrative staff reporting only once a month
to the Board in formal meetings." W. DOHERTY, JR. & F. Srmnms, WVU: SYnmoL.oF UNITY IN A
SECTIONALIZED STATE, 296 (1982).

97. 1979 AED REPORT, supra note 88, at 124-26.
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establishment of internal procedures, the Board seemed hesitant to
exercise its statutory authority and responsibility.98

98. One instance of the Board's reluctance to seize the initiative in the exercise of its statutory
authority is illustrated by the Board's decision in 1973 to seek an opinion of the Attorney General
of West Virginia concerning its statutory authority "(1) to merge two existing state institutions of
higher education; (2) to create a new institution of higher education; [and] (3) to abolish an institution
of higher education." 55 Op. Att'y Gen. 107 (1973). The Legislature had expressly provided that
"[tihe power herein given to the board to prescribe and allocate among the state colleges and universities specific functions and responsibilities to meet the higher educational needs of the state and
avoid unnecessary duplication shall not be restricted by any provision of law assigning specific functions and responsibilities to designated state colleges and universities but such power shall supersede
any such provision of law." Acts of Mar. 3, 1969, ch. 130, 169 W.Va. Acts 1142, 1149 (as codified
in W. VA. CODE § 18-26-8) (1984 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis supplied). The Board sought the Attorney
General's opinion because it did not believe it had the authority to act, and it did not want to suggest
that such authority was desirable.
In a circular fashion, without defining just what authority the Board of Regents did have in
the allocation and prescription of specific functions and responsibilities among the colleges and universities, the Attorney General concluded that because the Legislature had failed to specifically grant
the Board the authority to create, merge or abolish institutions of higher education and because the
existing institutions had all been created by statute, the Legislature did not intend to grant the Board
of Regents the power to create, merge or abolish institutions of higher education. 55 Op. Att'y Gen.
107 (1973). While this interpretation of W. VA. CODE § 18-26-8 (Repl. Vol. 1984) seems unnecessarily
stingy, particularly given the clear legislative intent to vest this type of responsibility with a single
governing board, the opinion could hardly be surprising in light of the Board's reluctance to exercise
its express statutory powers. Of course, the result of the Attorney General's advisory opinion was
that the merger issue became even more politicized as it was placed before the Legislature for its
consideration. This interpretation of the Board's authority was rendered more complicated by a subsequent opinion of the Attorney General which maintained that, while the Legislature had the exclusive
authority to create new institutions of higher education, the Board of Regents did not have a mandatory duty to establish, operate, administer or control the institution authorized by the Legislature.
56 Op. Att'y Gen. 161, 168 (1975). The Attorney General recognized that the West Virginia Board
of Regents, "in the exercise of the discretion granted to it by legislative action, and acting as the
sole statutory agency created and existing for the purpose of coordinating, controlling, supervising,
and administering all institutions of higher education in this state in the most efficient and economical
manner possible," could choose to establish or locate the legislatively authorized institution where,
in its judgment, it would best serve the interests of the citizens of the state, or it could choose not
to establish the legislatively authorized institution. Id. at 170. Thus, in the opinion of the Attorney
General (which was apparently accepted by the Board of Regents) the Board was without authority
to initiate the merger or closing of existing institutions, and it could not, without prior legislative
authority, create new institutions. At the same time, however, the Board could, in the Attorney
General's opinion, refuse to implement the Legislature's decision to create and fund a new institution.
In effect, according to the Attorney General, under the prevailing statutory provisions neither the
Legislature nor the Board had the complete authority to promote the efficient allocation of specific
responsibilities through the creation of new institutions or the merger or closing of existing institutions.
This was just one of several instances of the Board's reluctance to take the initiative in meeting
its responsibilities.
Another instance occurred early in 1979, when the Board of Regents once again turned to the
Attorney General for an opinion on the extent of its statutory authority to assess certain student fees.
At issue was the imposition of a Higher Education Resources Fund (HERF) fee pursuant to W.VA.
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As the Board proceeded cautiously and somewhat reluctantly to

exercise its statutory authority, it virtually ignored those areas in
which it could have had the most significant long-term impact. The
planning, coordinating and allocating of functions among the colleges and universities and the development of system-wide policies
for sound internal governance are two examples of areas which
begged for the Board's attention. Instead, the Board rigidly and
aggressively pursued its administrative authority over the individual
institutions.
One result of the Board's focus on the control and supervision
of the subordinate institutions was that there were few new initiatives
for higher education during the first ten years of the existence of
the Board of Regents. The system did experience a growth in the
number of students, faculty and programs. Five new institutions
were created, and there was an increase in the number of new buildings at some institutions.99 At the same time, however, the percentage of state appropriations for higher education dropped, and
the per-student support declined.'0° Legislative attention to higher
education matters was minimal. From 1970-1978, there were no sig-

18-24-1. W. VA. CODE § 18-24-1 (1969) provided that:
The governing boards of state educational institutions shall fix enrollment, tuition and other
fees for each semester or school term for the different classes or categories of students
enrolling at the state educational institutions, and may include among such fees any one
or more of the following: (I) health service fees; (2) infirmary fees; (3) student activities,
recreational, athletic and extracurricular fees;. . .and (4) graduate center fees and branch
college fees, or either, if the establishment and operation of graduate center or branch
colleges are otherwise authorized by law. All fees collected under (1), (2) and (3) shall be
paid into special funds and shall be used only for the purposes for which the fees are
collected.
Based on its reading of § 18-24-1 and a previous opinion of the Attorney General on a related issue,
the Board believed it was prohibited from assessing the fee. In that earlier opinion, the Attorney
General concluded that the specific enumeration of fees in § 18-24-1 which could be collected from
students could not be construed to authorize fees for the West Virginia Student Public Interest Research
Group. 55 Op. Att'y Gen. 148 (1973).
In an opinion which recognized the Board's "plenary powers to control and supervise all higher
educational institutions in the state and to do such things which are not contrary to law as the Board
may deem necessary to secure the successful operation of the educational system and promote the
designated objectives," 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 41, 44 (1979), the Attorney General confirmed the Board's
specific authority to collect "enrollment, tuition, and otherfees," and held that the Board's authority
to fix other fees encompassed the HERF fee. Id. at 46.
99. 1979 AED REPORT, supra note 88, at 118-22.
100. Id.
CODE §
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nificant statutory modifications to either the governance structure
or to the authority of the Board of Regents.10 1 In short, the Board's
record of performance during the first ten years is most remarkable
for its lack of real accomplishments.
The Board's mediocre performance did not go wholly unnoticed.
The first in-depth study of the new board was conducted in 1979
by the Academy for Educational Management. The study was commissioned by the Joint Committee on Government and Finance of
the West Virginia Legislature to survey developments in higher education in the state since 1969, to assess the Board of Regents' role
in "promoting and guiding the appropriate development of the higher
education system, 1 02 to "consider whether or not the role played
by the Board of Regents is consistent with the language and intent
of the enabling legislation," 0 3 and to "make recommendations on
continuation, modification, or elimination of the single governing
1 4
board structure."t
The Academy evaluated the Board of Regents "in terms of its
performance in meeting the responsibilities of a state-wide governing
board 0 5 and with respect to specific charges in the enabling legis-

101. There was very little legislative activity in the first six years of the Regents' existence. The
most notable legislation during this period related to the creation of the College of Graduate Studies,
Act of Mar. 10, 1972, ch. 115, 1972 W. Va. Acts 627, and the authorization for a School of Osteopathic Medicine, Act of Feb. 25, 1975, ch. 200, 1975 W. Va. Acts 714. There was slightly more
legislative activity in 1976 and 1977. Most of this activity related to the composition of the Board
of Regents, which was increased to twelve members by the addition of representatives from the newlycreated advisory council of students and advisory council of faculty. Act of Mar. 13, 1976, ch. 133,
1976 W. Va. Acts 616. In addition, the Legislature slightly modified the process by which members
of the institutional board of advisors were appointed. Id. at 621. Finally, the powers and duties of
the Board of Regents were amended to provide that "if a single budget is submitted, it shall be
accompanied by a tentative schedule of proposed allocation of funds to the separate colleges and
universities." Id. at 620.
102. 1979 AED REPoRT, supra note 88, at 1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 16. The responsibilities of a state-wide governing board were identified as including
"management, control and supervision of all
public higher education institutions, management of
state-wide higher education activities, budgeting, and planning." Id. The focus of the discussion in
this section will be on the Board's performance in the areas of governance; i.e., management, control
and supervision of all public higher institutions and management of state-wide higher education activities.
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lation.' 10 6 The Academy concluded that the Board had inadequately
performed its governance and budgeting roles and had not responded

appropriately to its planning mandate. 107The Academy gave a "qualified endorsement," however, to the Board for its performance in

the area of state-wide activities.10s
In evaluating the Board's performance of its governance role,
the Academy concluded that the Board of Regents had
stressed control rather than management; ha[d] failed to establish and maintain
positive relationships with the various campus constituencies; ha[d] not been adequately sensitive to the differences among institutions under its aegis; and ha[d]
not developed an acceptable grievance or appeals procedure. Additionally, the
Board of Regents ha[d] not utilized the various advisory structures well. Thus,
while the Board of Regents has good control over the system, the current approach
is not well-suited to the differentiated governance needs of the various institutions.101

In summary, the Academy found that the Board of Regents had
failed to successfully fulfill its role as the state-wide governing board

for higher education." 0 The Academy tempered its criticism by rec106. The Academy reviewed the enabling legislation and found it to be broad and vague; it
further concluded that particularly damaging was the Legislature's failure to clearly describe "the
expected relationship between the Board of Regents and the Legislature, the mechanisms that are to
be used to report accomplishments and problems, or the ways in which the Board of Regents is to
be held accountable for its actions by . . . appropriate legislative oversight committees." Id. at 115.
107. Id. at 164-66.
108. Id. at 166.
109. Id. at 164.
110. More specifically, the Academy found:
I. The Regents and the central staff spend enough, and, perhaps, too much, time on
governance matters.
2. The Board has created a system, which has been implemented by the central staff, that
permits the Board to exercise almost complete control over the institutions. Since the presidents are selected by the Board of Regents, they tend to support Board policies without
challenge.
3. The Regents and the central staff tend to become overly involved in minutiae that relate
to practices of control and supervision, rather than to good future-oriented management.
4. The Board of Regents has vested too much administrative authority in the presidents
without developing adequate grievance or appeals mechanisms.
5. The centralized approach, utilized by the Board of Regents, does not permit adequate
meaningful participation by mid-level staff, faculty, or community leaders.
6. The advisory group structure is not effectively utilized. For several reasons, these groups
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ognizing that "a confluence of factors, including the magnitude of

the problem, and the personalities of key individuals" had prevented
the Board from successfully fulfilling its role."'

are not in the position to provide candid and helpful insights about the institutions.
7. The Board of Regents does not meet frequently enough on the various campuses, and
the central staff does not spend adequate time discussing educational issues at the campus
level. This results in ill-conceived efforts to standardize decisions for all institutions with
inadequate sensitivity to the differing impacts and results.
8. The relative isolation from the governance structure, and the absence of mechanisms
through which they can voice their opinions on educational issues, have led faculty to form
erroneous judgments. The isolation has also contributed to a decline in morale and enthusiasm on the part of some faculty.
9. The state-level information system, which could be the best in the country, has failed
to fulfill its potential because its use is data- and control-oriented, rather than policy- and
management-oriented.
10. The absence of goals for institutional performance has made it impossible for the
Board of Regents to undertake meaningful performance evaluations of institutional and
presidential performance.
Id. at 130-31.
The Academy was equally critical of the Board's performance in its budgetary role.
In performing the budgeting role, the Board of Regents has not achieved the level of State
support that it claims is necessary to operate the system. This failure is exacerbated by the
apparent over-funding of a faculty formula that the Regent's staff defends as adequate.
Based on its own formula calculations, there are major misallocations of faculty among
institutions. Furthermore, the budgeting and allocation process does not relate, in any apparent manner, to either system-wide or institutional goals; has not been explained so that
it is intelligible to most institutional personnel; and involves limited meaningful participation
by institutional staff. Credit should be given to the Board of Regents for developing the
foundation for a first-rate management information system, a potential that can be realized
with a change in perception of the role of management information, and a modest amount
of additional effort.
In responding to its planning mandate, the Board of Regents has attempted to make
the process more participatory during the development of a second State-wide master plan.
The master planning effort is fatally flawed, however, because State needs are inadequately
documented; goals are not established; the capabilities of all postsecondary education to
meet the needs are not adequately assessed; and projections are developed that are questionable, given the trends and the attitudes of State government officials. As a result, the
Board of Regents' tactical planning efforts, some of which are quite good, are not undertaken within an overall development framework. The result may be short-term maximization with long-term negative impact. In addition, the Board of Regents has not utilized
the second master planning effort to candidly address current or emerging issues. It has,
thereby, lost some of its potential to develop intelligent responses.
Id. at 165 (emphasis in original).
111. Id. at 166. Interestingly, the Academy also assessed some fault for the Board's poor performance to the Legislature for its failure to offer sufficient guidance to the Board through articulation
of specific goals for the higher education system. Id.
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The Academy offered two options for the Legislature's consideration. The first and the preferred option recommended that the
Board of Regents be replaced by a state coordinating board and
three associated governing boards.1 1 2 The second option recom-

112. The Academy reasoned that a governance structure composed of a state coordinating Board
of Higher Education (BHE) and three governing boards would best meet divergent needs of a large
number of state institutions of higher education. The West Virginia Board of Higher Education, a
state coordinating board responsible for state-level planning, would coordinate and perhaps operate
state-wide educational activities; it would develop appropriation and allocation recommendations and
would report annually to the Legislature on higher education performance. 1979 AED Report supra
note 88, at 171.
State-wide planning would encompass "development of specific and differentiated missions and
goals" for public institutions of higher education. Id. at 172. The Board's budget request to the
Legislature should include both individual institutions' requests and the Board's recommendations in
light of funding priorities. Id. at 174. State-wide education activities would include federal grant
programs, student aid, provision for high-cost specialized programs, educational television, and a
consolidated management information system to serve its own needs and those of the three governing
boards and state government planners. The eleven members of the Board would be appointed by the
Governor and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms, with no more than six members from the
same political party. Board membership would include no more than two graduates of the same
institution and at least two members who did not graduate from any West Virginia public institution
of higher education. Id. at 177. The Board would elect a Chancellor and would meet formally at
least ten times each year; it would control public advocacy by institutions or governing boards and
would determine which representatives of individual institutions or their governing boards testified
before the Legislature on educational or budget matters. Id. at 178.
The Academy proposed a Board of Visitors (BOV) as the governing board for West Virginia
University and its branches, Marshall University, the School of Osteopathic Medicine, and the College
,of Graduate Studies (COGS). The BOV would supervise the institutions which offer graduate and
professional instruction under BHE's state-wide guidelines. The BOV would define the decision-making
process for academic, budget, and personnel matters and the roles of each institution's president,
faculty, students, and any staff representatives. Id. at 179. The BOV would select presidents for its
institutions and review their performance; it would develop a personnel plan for all employees, including an "open and public grievance and appeals process." Id. at 180. The BOV would be accountable for all resources used by its institutions. Id. In developing budget requests and allocating
legislative appropriations to its institutions, the BOV would demonstrate use of resources to further
each institution's mission. Id. at 181.
BOV membership would consist of seven members, five appointed by the Governor and confirmed
by the Senate, with no more than four from the same political party and no more than two who
graduated from the same BOV institution. One faculty representative and one student member, chosen
by the elected student organization heads, would each have full voting powers. Id. at 181-82.
The Academy proposed a Board of Governors (BOG) for the state undergraduate colleges (Bluefield State College, Concord College, Fairmont State College, Glenville State College, Shepherd College, West Liberty State College, West Virginia State College and West Virginia Institute of Technology).
BOG powers and responsibilities would be the same as those of the BOV.
The third board, a Board of Trustees (BOT), would govern institutions focusing on "technical
and transfer programs at the lower division level" (Parkersburg Community College, Southern West
Virginia Community College, West Virginia Northern Community College, all of their branches, and
the Greenbrier Center). Id. at 184. The BOT would have the same responsibilities as the BOV and
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mended that the single governing board structure be retained with

major revisions in the procedures and operations of the Board of
Regents. The Academy further recommended that the Regents' enabling legislation be amended to specifically indicate legislative pri113
orities for higher education.
The significance of the Academy Report is found not only in its
recommendations, but also in the fact that the criticism of the Board
which had been merely anecdotal or ill-formed, was by this report

considerably substantiated. The report is also noteworthy as an at-

tempt to identify at least some of the factors which contributed to
the Board's inadequacies.

Despite the fact that it had commissioned the study, the Legislature did not immediately respond to the Academy's recommenthe BOG.
The Academy posited that its preferred option would be both more economical and more efficient
than the then-current system because the planning and governance functions would be split, with the
three governance boards closer to their institutions. Id. at 186. The BHE, the state-wide coordinating
board, would represent all governing boards and institutions before the Legislature; such a central
group, viewing the Legislature rather than the institutions as its primary constituency, could more
effectively convey policy recommendations than the Board of Regents (BOR), which reported primarily
to its institutions. Id. at 187. Three boards, each representing a group of institutions with similar
aims, could advocate to the BHE the long-range needs of their institutions more effectively than the
BOR, which found it difficult to identify specific needs within the large group of institutions. Id. at
191.
113. Under the Academy's second option, retention of the BOR as a state-wide governing board,
the Academy recommended that the BOR should meet at least four times annually on institutional
campuses to promote the BOR's better understanding of institutions' special needs and to reduce
institutions' isolation. Id. at 195. Faculty and student participation should be fostered and institutional
advisory boards strengthened although the BOR and the Chancellor would need authority to make
systemwide decisions. Grievance and appeals procedures needed to be revised. Id. at 197. Greater
attention to a changing student mix would better further state-wide goals than BOR emphasis on
standardized spending without reference to differentiated goals. Id. Each institutional president should
be evaluated every five years for analysis of progress toward the institution's goals. Id. at 200.
The Academy further recommended that the BOR develop closer contact with the Legislature,
both in order to understand state government's concerns about higher education and to explain higher
education goals and needs to government officials. Id. at 204. Tuition and fees should be reviewed
in light of weak state support for higher education and the low cost of higher education in West
Virginia relative to the cost of higher education in surrounding states. Since low costs subsidize students
at all economic levels, student aid should be closely related to student need. Id. at 208.
Long-range planning, including definition of each public institution's mission and goals, should
be done in cooperation with state government officials, public and private institutions of higher education, and other postsecondary programs. Id. at 210. The Legislature should make clear its expectations of the BOR and should review annually BOR's report on progress toward educational
goals. The Legislature must also consider budget and educational needs together, rather than separately
as in the past, because each is integral to an understanding of the other. Id. at 217.
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dations. Instead, in the 1980 legislative session following the receipt

of the Board's report, the Legislature enacted just two minor amendments to the state regulatory scheme, neither of which addressed
14
issues raised by the Academy report. 1
There was a limited though significant legislative response to the

Academy's report in the next legislative session. In response to the
Academy's recommendations concerning the specific statutory enu-

meration of legislative priorities, the 1981 Higher Education Management Act completely revised the statutory description of the Board
of Regents' powers and duties." 5 The amendments clarified the

Board's role in the budgeting process, mandated the involvement of
faculty, classified staff and students in the Board's planning and

decision-making process, revised the appeal and grievance processes,
and required the periodic evaluation of college and university pres-

idents.' 16 In addition, the 1981 amendments altered the composition
and appointment of the institutional advisory boards by providing
for more diverse representation. However, the advisory boards' au-

thority and duty remained virtually unchanged." 7 Notwithstanding
these major modifications to the statutory authority of the Board
of Regents, the Legislature generally maintained the laissez-faire at-

titude characteristic of the early phase of governance under the Board
of Regents."'

114. Act of Mar. 8, 1980, ch. 47, 1980 W. Va. Acts 228 (minor changes in nurse program and
state scholarships); Act of Mar. 7, 1980, ch. 33, 1980 W. Va. Acts 147, 161 (increasing maximum
interest on bonds from 8% to 10%).
115. Act of Apr. 9, ch. 91, 1981 W. Va. Acts 347.
116. Id.
117. 1981 W. Va. Acts ch. 91, W. VA. CODE § 18-26-9 (Repl. Vol. 1984), mandated a "board
of advisors" (BOA) for each state college and university, to consist of an administrative officer, a
faculty member, a student, a member of the classified staff, and seven lay citizens appointed by the
BOR, of whom no more than four could be of the same political party. Such BOA's would replace
the seven-member advisory boards appointed by each state college or university president under prior
§ 18-26-9 (1976).
The older version of § 18-26-9 did not specify BOA duties, but the 1981 revision of W. VA.
CODE § 18-26-9 provides that each institution's BOA shall meet at least quarterly and that the BOA
shall review its institution's president's statement of mission, academic programs, budget, and capital
needs before its submission to the BOR. The BOA also serves as a search committee when a new
president is sought for its institution.
118. Legislative modifications to the statutes on higher education were, during this first phase,
relatively minor. See e.g., 1982 W. Va. Acts 52, where the definition of "higher educational institution" in W. VA. CODE § 18-26-2(g) (Repl. Vol. 1984) was amended to include private proprietary
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The Board of Regents also failed to respond in a significant way
to the Academy's recommendations. The Board claimed that significant modifications were made in 1979 as a result of the Academy's recommendations. 1 19 However, a close examination of the
Board's own detailed response to each of the Academy's thirty-two
recommendations negates the Regents' claim. The record clearly
shows that there were no significant administrative modifications in
20
1979 nor were significant revisions made in the following years.
Thus, despite its protests to the contrary, the Board of Regents
virtually ignored the Academy's recommendations regarding internal
restructuring of Board procedures. In turn, the Legislature ignored
the Academy's recommendation that the statutory framework for
the governance of higher education be completely revamped.'2 '
The troubling paradox of these responses to the Academy's report is that the Legislature acted on the recommendations which
were directed to the Board of Regents, and it imposed, by statute,
a more specific enumeration of policies and procedures which should

colleges operated for profit. Section 18-26-13(a) on accreditation was amended to provide that the
BOR's grant of the right to award degrees would not be invalidated by the section's accreditation
standards.
The opportunity for the Legislature to critically evaluate the performance of the Board of Regents
was presented again in mid-1984 when the Joint Committee on Government Operations received the
legislative auditor's performance audit of the West Virginia Board of Regents. This audit, which was
conducted pursuant to West Virginia's "sunset" laws (f. VA. CODE § 4-10-9(c) (Repl. Vol. 1987))
was for the purpose of determining "whether there is a demonstrable need for the continuation of
the particular entity... ." Id. The performance audit of the Board was far from rigorous. Although
it was conducted pursuant to the statutorily prescribed criteria, with few exceptions the audit report
reflected the Board of Regents' own response to the performance audit questionnaire. These responses
were reported and accepted with little or no examination. The performance audit also neutrally reported the recommendation of the Academy for Educational Development which related to the Board's
internal operations and procedures; the audit report further contained the Board of Regents' responses
to these recommendations. There was no attempt, however, to critically assess either the merits of
these recommendations or the Board's response to them. Interestingly, particularly in light of the
purpose of the sunset legislation, or the actions of the Board taken in response to them, neither the
Legislative Auditor in his performance audit, nor the Board of Regents in its response to the performance audit questionnaire, directly addressed the Academy's recommendation that the single governing board be abolished.
119. WEST VIRGINIA BD. OF REGENTS, PERFORMANCE AuDrr QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE 7 (June
30, 1984).
120. Id. app. § I (Repl. Vol. 1984).
121. Recall that this was essentially the recommendation of the W. Va. Comm'n on Higher
Education in 1968. See text accompanying note 80-83, supra.
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have been administratively developed. 122 It is ironic that the Board
was required by statute to modify its internal procedures and operations when it had earlier declined to implement these procedures
voluntarily.
B.

The Interventionist Period

One consequence of the laissez-faire phase of governance was
that higher education in West Virginia suffered from a serious lack
of leadership. As the Board of Regents concentrated its attentions
on the issues of control and internal administrative procedures, it
neglected to fulfill its leadership role in the development of educational policies for the state. As institutions and individuals who
had suffered from the lack of leadership turned to the courts and
the Legislature to express their concerns, the governance of higher
education shifted into the interventionist phase.
An analysis of the judicial and legislative developments affecting
higher education during the past ten years illustrates how the courts
and Legislature have filled the void created by the Board's inaction.,121.

Judicial Developments

Five recent decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals are surveyed as examples of the judicial activity characteristic of this phase. In North v. W. Va. Board of Regents,124 the
court examined the constitutionality of the procedures by which a

122. W. VA. CODE § 18-26-8(a) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
123. The relationship between the law and higher education in this regard is significant:
[T]he volume of academic litigation will depend most of all upon the extent to which colleges
and universities maintain order in their own houses. Many court decisions reveal a substantial
and appropriate degree of deference to internal due process. One reason why the University
of California has fared so well in the courts seems to be the extent to which campus
procedural rules have anticipated the judicial decree.
R. O'NEtL, CouRTs, GOVERNMENT & HIGHER EDUCATION 16 (1972). It has also been observed that
"[a]n educational institution can neither conduct a sound educational program if its operational procedures are set by legislative act, nor can it be properly administered if an agency outside the institution
exercises undue and restrictive financial control." M. CAMBERS, supra note 46, at 9.
124. North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 160 W. Va. 248, 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977).
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medical student was expelled from the West Virginia University
School of Medicine for misconduct.
The court held that the petitioner's liberty or property interest
in his medical school education was such that the University could
not order his expulsion without providing minimal constitutional due
process protections. The court remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. In remanding the case, the court established
specific guidelines for conducting disciplinary hearings in cases involving such expulsions.125
The significance of the court's decision in North rests not so
much in its holding that students facing expulsion from a state institution are entitled to due process, but in the fact that the court
defined, in fairly precise terms, the type of hearing to which North
was entitled.126 North stands as the first in a series of cases in which
the court stepped in to make higher education policy where the Board
of Regents had failed to do so.

One year later, in a case involving the termination of a probationary faculty member, the court considered the issue of whether
125. WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF REoENTs, POLICIES, RUsS, AND REGULATIONS REGARDING STUDENT
RIGHTS, RESPONSmILITIES, AND CONDUCT IN WEST VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (August

4, 1970) and WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF REGENTS PoLcI BULLErIN No. 9 (June 30, 1971 amendment)
contained administrative regulations governing the conduct of such hearings. In North's case, a committee of medical school faculty and administrators conducted a hearing but gave North no formal
notice of charges before or during the hearing. North was invited into the hearing only after the
committee had heard the "adverse information," and he was then subjected to cross-examination by
the committee. North, 160 W. Va. at 250, 233 S.E.2d at 414.
The same committee conducted the second hearing, at which North gave his explanation of the
charges but was not represented by an attorney. No "verbatim record or transcript" of the hearing
was made. Id. at 251, 233 S.E.2d at 414.
126. Id. at 257, 233 S.E.2d at 417. The court went even further and in dicta held that the same
standard [of due process] "may well apply to lengthy suspensions which would have the practical
effect of preventing the student from completing his academic program." Id.
Although the law in the area of student rights was relatively new at the time the court rendered
its first decision in North, it was nonetheless fairly well-settled, and the rudiments of procedural due
process were known to most governmental entities which were obligated to provide it. Despite this
fact, the court made an effort to quite clearly describe the hearing which the Board of Regents,
through the University, was required to conduct.
The guidelines promulgated by the court were not advisory or illustrative; rather, there is little
doubt that the court intended the University to strictly adhere to these guidelines in all student disciplinary proceedings. The court acknowledged its intent the second time it considered North's appeal,
stating "We set the guidelines for the process that a university must follow in student disciplinary
proceedings . . . . " North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141 (W. Va. 1985).
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a probationary faculty member who met the objective eligibility criteria for tenure was entitled to procedural due process before being
denied tenure.127 In Morton v. McLendon the court concluded, based
on the existence of the Board of Regents' policy on tenure and the
tenure program of the college, that this probationary faculty member
had more than a unilateral expectation of tenure. The court held
that this interest constituted "a sufficient entitlement so that she
could not be denied tenure on the issue of her competency without
12 8
some procedural due process.
The court next considered what due process protections existed
under the Board and college policies to safeguard against erroneous
deprivation of the protected right. On this point, the court concluded
"there are currently no orderly procedures or protections that exist
for one who meets the objective standards for tenure eligibility but
is denied tenure."' 29 Accordingly, the court required the Board of
Regents to add an additional step in the existing process whereby
the probationary faculty member who had met the objective standards for tenure eligibility would be given notice of the reasons why
tenure was denied. In addition, the court held that a hearing before
an unbiased hearing tribunal was required so that the faculty member could submit evidence to rebut the reasons given for the denial
of tenure. 30
Once again, the Board's failure to adequately define the rights
of its faculty through the promulgation of appropriate procedures
resulted in judicial imposition of a procedure where the court not
only adjudicated the dispute between the parties, but also established
a state-wide policy on tenure.
Before the Board could respond to the mandate of Morton v.
McLendon to modify its existing policies on tenure, the Legislature
exhibited its own willingness to become involved in specific academic

127.
128.
129.
130.

State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 162 W. Va. 431, 249 S.E.2d 919 (V. Va. 1978).
Id. at 443, 249 S.E.2d at 925.
Id. at 444, 249 S.E.2d at 926.
Id. The Board of Regents' policy which was in effect at the time of this case did permit

an appeal to the Board by non-tenured faculty of non-retention deicisons. 128 C.S.R. 36 §15.1 (1974).
The court held that this review should follow the hearing mandated by its decision in McLendon v.
Morton, 162 W. Va. at 446, n.13, 249 S.E.2d at 927, n.13.
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issues. A statute was enacted in the 1984 legislative session which
granted all probationary faculty members certain procedural and
substantive rights."
This new statute went beyond the holding of McLendon by granting certain procedural and substantive rights to all probationary faculty, not just to those who meet the objective tenure eligibility
criteria. 13 2 When the Board finally modified the policy, it had very
little discretion left in this area because the Legislature had already
codified rights beyond those guaranteed in McLendon.
Certain procedures of the Board of Regents were again the focus
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Clarke v. W.
Va. Bd. of Regents. 33 In Clarke, the court reviewed the Board's
appeal procedures applicable to "for cause" terminations of tenured
faculty members. The court acknowledged that neither the statute
nor the Board of Regents' policies required the hearing examiner
appointed by the Board to conduct appeals in these matters, to make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, or to state the
reasons for his decision and the evidence which supported these reasons. Nonetheless, over a strong dissent, the court required such
34
findings and conclusions.
The court's attention to the Board of Regents' affairs shifted to
a completely different arena in UMWA v. Parsons.13 The issue in
Parsons was the constitutional obligation of a state university to
permit the presentation of contrasting political views in paid advertisements which are broadcast during athletic events.1 36 While the
substantive issue in Parsons is not central to this discussion, the
manner in which the court resolved the dispute is of interest.
131. W. VA. CODE § 18-26-8c (Repl. Vol. 1984).
132. Id. See also, Hanna, McLendon v. Morton & the Legislative Response: A ProceduralBarrier
to Quality Education in West Virginia, 7 J. COLL. & U.L. 111 (1980-81).
133. Clarke v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 166 W. Va. 702, 279 S.E.2d 169 (1981).
134. Id. at 717, 279 S.E.2d at 179. On the second issue, the propriety of a post-deprivation
hearing, the court found that the Board had contravened its own policies in removing the appellant
from the payroll prior to the hearing on his dismissal, Id., and held that suspension with pay during
the pendency of the hearing would have protected the interests of the appellant as well as the institution.
135. UMWA v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va. 1983).
136. Id. at 346.
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Invoking some of the principles of the fairness doctrine, 137 the

court held that under the West Virginia Constitution "when a state
agency or instrumentality sells advertising for broadcast which presents one side of a politically controversial issue of public concern,
it is obligated . . . to preserve its neutrality by providing a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of
138
view ....
The court went beyond the articulation of this new principle to
prescribe the method by which the university was to fulfill its obligation to present contrasting points of view. While recognizing that
under the traditional fairness doctrine a flexible approach to implementation of the doctrine should be employed, the court held
that "several factors militate against allowing respondents to exercise
such discretion in this case."' 39 The court then specifically concluded
that the UMWA would have a right to respond to the controversial
advertisements if they appeared again. In addition, the court ordered
that the Board of Regents promulgate standards for evaluating re-

quests for response time. 40 The relief granted in Parsons was controversial even among the members of the court. Although the court
issued a unanimous opinion, a dissenting footnote criticized the majority for moulding relief "in a legislative fashion."' 4' The Parsons

137. Id. at 353. The "fairness doctrine," a common law principle developed since the advent
of broadcast media, is based on the fact that broadcasting channels, and therefore access to the
public, are limited. The Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) for some years sought to
ensure the public's opportunity to hear both sides of controversial issues of public importance. If a
proponent of one view evidenced to the F.C.C. that an F.C.C. licensee/broadcaster had shown "unfairness and imbalance" in reporting an issue of sufficient controversy and importance to the public,
the broadcaster would be required to provide program time for presentation of opposing views. Id.
138. Id. at 354.
139. Id. at 359. The factors identified by the court were that the respondents had failed to seek
out persons to respond to the advertisements even though they were aware of the politically controversial character of the advertisements, the UMWA had been denied access, the repondents had failed
to contact an alternative opposing viewpoint, no other person or group had requested the opportunity
to respond to the advertisements, and the UMWA had expressed a direct interest in presenting the
opposing view. Id. at 359-60.
140. In response to the Parsonsdecision, the Board of Regents promulgated Policy Bulletin #
3, 128 C.S.R. 3 (1983) which applies to all Board of Regents' controlled broadcast media programming
and which limits the sale of commercial advertising time to the "sale of standard product commercials
which are designed to advocate or promote the sale of a product or services."
141. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d at 360, n. 19. The dissenters objected to the majority's decision to
award prospective relief only.
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decision is yet another vivid example of how the court was prompted
by the Board's inaction to intervene in the development of educational policy.
The final case in this series offers the most striking example of
an area in which the Board abdicated its responsibilities. In WVUACE v. Saunders142 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
considered a writ of mandamus to compel modification of a policy
of West Virginia University which prohibited solicitation of employees for membership in non-University organizations during "declared work time in working areas of the University."' 43 The court
issued the writ on the ground that such regulations must be narrowly
drawn to minimize the potential chilling effects of regulations governing the exercise of constitutional rights; it went further, though,
and dictated what the precise modification to the policy should be.144
In essence, the court drafted the regulation for the University.
It is not surprising that the court assumed some of the responsibility for making educational policy for the state of West Virginia,
because the Board of Regents had shown little leadership, ability or
45
success in doing so itself.1
2.

Legislative Developments

The Legislature also played a greater role in the governance process during the second decade of the Board of Regents. Whereas the
Legislature's involvement in higher education had previously been
limited to matters of funding, some minor restructuring, and administrative details which could have arguably been handled inter142. WVU-ACE v. Saunders, 1985 W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. (exp. let. serv.) No. 16719 at 220
(July 17, 1985). The policy at issue had been promulgated by West Virginia University, modified and
subsequently approved by the Board of Regents.
143. Id. at 220.
144. Id. at 221. The court granted the writ of mandamus instructing inclusion of the phrase
"while work tasks are being performed" in the policy of the respondents.

145. Perhaps the court can be fairly criticized for the extent to which it intruded into the policymaking function of the Board of Regents. However, the Board's own lack of leadership in this area
may be combined with the activism of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to explain the

nature and extent of the court's intervention, but the court cannot be faulted for taking the initiative
in these circumstances.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss1/2

34

in Higher Education
Governance:
One State's Struggle for E
19881 Van Tol: CrisisHIGHER
EDUCATION
GOVERNANCE

nally by the Board,'4 around 1983 the Legislature shifted its attention
to policy matters involving higher education. In addition, the Legislature provided outlets through which dissatisfied constituents of
the Board of Regents could express concerns and seek action.
A review of the significant legislative developments in the past
six years highlights this shift. The first evidence of the fact that the
Legislature was beginning to become more active in important policy
matters of the Board is found in a 1983 amendment to the West
Virginia Code which created a statutory scheme for determining the
seniority of classified employees of the Board.1 47 Next, in 1984, the
Legislature created but did not fund a full-time faculty salary schedule which dictated a system-wide minimum pay scale for faculty at
Board of Regents institutions. 148 During the next year, despite the
fact that there were already in existence several different appeals
procedures, the Legislature added a completely new statutory grievance procedure which covered all Board of Regents employees. 149
The Legislature also created an Eminent Scholars Program 5 ° and

146. Some of the legislative action has, of course, been necessary to provide the Board with the
requisite statutory authority to act in certain areas; for example, in the issuance of revenue bonds
for construction of new facilities or in the reconstructing of the composition of the Board. For
example, § 18-12A-3 authorized the BOR to approve revenue bonds for Marshall University buildings,
raising the maximum stated interest rate from five percent, in the 1963 version of the statute, to
seven per cent and the maximum yield on discounted bonds from six to eight percent. A 1974 amendment of § 18-12A-3 removed the $5,700,000 cap on total capital improvement revenue bonds for
Marshall University. Act of Mar. 9, 1974, ch. 120, 1974 W. Va. Acts 692.
By a 1974 amendment, the Legislature authorized the BOR to issue $8,500,000 in new Marshall
University revenue bonds for capital improvements, including land acquisition for parking and athletic
facilities. Act of Mar. 9, 1974, ch. 120, 1974 W. Va. Acts 692 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE
§ 18-12A-1). A related amendment of W. VA. CODE § 18-12A-2 (Act of Mar. 9, 1974, ch. 120, 1974
W. Va. Acts 694) authorized the BOR to use Marshall's capital improvements fund for parking and
athletic facilities as well as for educational buildings and a student center as authorized under the
previous (1963) version of the statute.
W. VA. CODE § 18-12B-1 (Act of Apr. 9, 1977, ch. 90, 1977 W. Va. Acts 233) authorized the
BOR to issue revenue bonds, under conditions similar to those of §§ 18-11A-3 and 18-12A-3, for
capital improvements at any institution of higher education under BOR governance. In addition to
general authority, BOR was directed to sell bonds for specific projects at individual institutions.
147. Act of Mar. 12, 1983, ch. 79, 1983 W. Va. Acts 418, (W. VA. CODE § 18-26-27).
148. Act of Mar. 9, 1984, ch. 67, 1984 W. Va. Acts 491, (W. VA. CODE §§ 18-22-1 to 18-22-

6).
149. Act of Apr. 12, 1985, ch. 71, 1985 W. Va. Acts 428, (f.

VA. CODE §§ 18-29-1 to 18-29-

150. Act of Apr. 13, 1985, ch. 67, 1985 W. Va. Acts 416, (f.
22A-9).

VA. CODE §§ 18-22A-1 to 18-

9).
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authorized a continuing education program for faculty and classified
staff. 151

In 1986 the Legislature amended the still unfunded faculty salary
schedule and the classified employee salary schedule and classification system.1 52 In addition, the Legislature created two new institutes, one for West Virginia University and one for Marshall
53
University.
The troubling aspect of this flurry of legislative activity relating
to Board of Regents policy is that it further underscores the Board's
abdication of responsibility. The Board clearly had the statutory
authority and duty to set policy in these areas, but it did nothing.
Legislative action would not have been necessary to accomplish these
54
changes had the Board exercised its broad powers.1
C. Two Decades Summarized
As two decades of governance under the West Virginia Board
of Regents near an end, it is clear that the Board has failed to
accomplish the reforms envisioned by the Legislature in 1969. One
need only recall the apparent legislative intent underlying the creation of the Board of Regents to see the Board's inadequacies. 55
The Legislature has not been insulated from institutional lobbying. Instead, as funding for higher education has declined, lobbying by institutional representatives has intensified; it has become
:a commonplace activity of many public colleges and universities.
The first legislative goal has been ignored by the Board of Regents.

151. Act of Apr. 13, 1985, ch. 70, 1985 W. Va. Acts 427, (,V. VA. CODE § 18-26-30).
152. Act of May 20, 1986, ch. 12, 1986 W. Va. Acts Ist Extraordinary Sess. 1369 (W. VA.
CODE §§ 18-22-2 to 18-22-5). Act of Mar. 8, 1986, ch. 68, 1986 W. Va. Acts 549, (W. VA. CODE
§§ 18-26B-1 to 18-26B-9).
153. W. VA. CODE §§ 18-26C-1, 18-26D-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Supp. 1988). In 1987 no legislation
was enacted which directly affected the Board of Regents. In the 1988 session, only minor amendments
affected public higher education. W. VA. CODE §§ 18-26C-1; 18-26D-1 (Supp. 1988).
154. The Legislature's willingness to act on concerns of dissatisfied constituents of the Board
of Regents no doubt contributed to the perceptions of the Board's ineffectiveness. Moreover, by
providing this avenue for making "end runs" around the Board, the Legislature may have underscored
the lack of confidence in the Board's leadership which many constituents had already expressed.
155. Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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The Board of Regents has also frustrated the legislative intent
that budgetary and operational responsibilities be fixed in one entity;
instead, because the Board has failed to assume a leadership role,
the Legislature and the courts have been forced to become active
in this area and assume some of these responsibilities.
Finally, the Board has done little to promote state-wide planning
activities to increase efficiency. There is no evidence of significant
cost-saving measures instituted by the Board; the number of institutions within the system has grown, and the Board has not been
successful in its attempts to consolidate or merge institutions within
the system. Moreover, the Board has failed to develop, through a
system-wide planning process, a well-reasoned plan for the future
of higher education in West Virginia.
After two decades of ineffectiveness, it seems unlikely that the
Board of Regents will suddenly reverse its course and fully exercise
the power and responsibility granted it. The Board's credibility has
been severely damaged over the last decade. 15 6 It has been soundly
criticized and gently warned; the Legislature has given it more specific direction; it has twice been threatened with extinction. The
Board of Regents has turned a deaf ear to these legislative efforts
and the quality of higher education has suffered the consequences
of the Board's inability to operate effectively within the sphere of
authority granted it. In fact, "[b]y almost any measure, higher education in West Virginia is in terrible shape.' ' 5 7 The time is ripe
for the development of a legislative alternative.

V.

ALTERNATIVE FoRMs OF GoVERNANcE

During the past twenty years, several alternative forms of governance have been proposed; three of the alternatives merit further
156. Most of the popular criticism of the Board of Regents' performance is, in fact, a criticism
of the consolidated governing board structure. This criticism is typically focused on the following
points:
- the Board of Regents fails to adequately recognize different institutional missions;
- the Board of Regents fails to promote these institutional differences;
-institutional differences are homogenized by the Board of Regents;
- the Board of Regents tends to stifle competition among the colleges and universities;
- the Board of Regents is too far removed to understand campus problems.
157. Chronicle of Higher Education, Sept. 1, 1988.
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examination to determine whether they offer viable solutions to the
problems which currently plague higher education in West Virginia.
A.

The H.B. 1484 Proposal

The most recent alternative, H.B. 1484,118 was proposed during
the 1986 legislative session as the West Virginia Legislature was considering the expiration of the Board of Regents pursuant to the

statutory sunset provisions. House Bill 1484 was intended to
streamline the administration of the system of higher education in Vest Virginia
by substituting
by establishing
to allow for a
each institution

a commission on higher education for the board of regents and
a board of trustees for each institution of higher education so as
decentralization of decision-making authority which will enable
to more fully tailor its policies to its specific goals and missions."19

The proposal envisioned a three-member West Virginia Commission
on Higher Education which the Governor would appoint. The Commission would assume most, but not all, of the duties of the Board
of Regents. 1 60 A separate board of trustees would be appointed by

the Governor for each college and university. Each eleven member
board would have the power and duty to determine, control, supervise and manage its own institution's financial and business pol-

icies and affairs.' 61

The approach taken in H.B. 1484 is the least desirable of the

three alternatives because it incorporates and exacerbates the worst
features of both the consolidated governing board and the coordinating board approaches. The House proposal retains much of the

former Board of Regents' authority but shifts it to a three person,
158. H.B. 1484, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1986).
159. Id. (See note by Speaker of the House Joseph Albright and Delegate Swan following the
text of the bill).
160. The Commission's authority would be restricted to offering its recommendations on each
institution's budget requests. Id. at § 18-26-8(a)(1), (9)(c); in addition it would not have the authority
to administer a uniform system of personnel classification and compensation, § 18-26-8(a)(6); neither
would it have the authority to conduct performance evaluations of presidents, § 18-26-9(c)(7), (9).
Under the H.B. 1484 proposal, the institutional board of trustees would assume the authority in these
last two areas.
161. Id. §§ 18-26-8(a)(1), 18-26-9. Apparently, it was the intent of H.B. 1484 that Potomac State
College would be governed by the West Virginia University's Board of Trustees. See id. § 18-26-(2)(b)
for the definition of "state colleges," which excludes Potomac State College.
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full-time commission. This central body would still have responsibility for the determination, management, control and supervision
of educational policy, the area in which the Board of Regents has
been the most ineffective. This proposal would perpetuate a basic
flaw of the consolidated governing board structure: the vesting of
centralized authority in a body which is not directly accountable to
its constituents. Under this proposal the management, control, supervision and determination of financial and business affairs, the
area in which the Board of Regents was at least minimally effective,
would be decentralized. Thus, H.B. 1484 would perpetuate the unwise centralization and would decentralize authority where central
control can be effective.
Moreover, the H.B. 1484 proposal would push decentralization
and local governance to an extreme by creating fifteen separate governing boards. Without skillful administration from a strong central
body, the proliferation of separate governing boards could be expected to result in unnecessary and costly duplication of programs.
B.

The AED Proposal

A different alternative was proposed earlier by the Academy for
Educational Development (AED) in its 1979 study of higher education in West Virginia. The Academy recommended the adoption
of a coordinating board structure for governance with the creation
of a West Virginia Board of Higher Education and three separate
governing boards. 162 The AED suggested that the Governor appoint
an eleven member Board of Higher Education which would be responsible for
state-level planning; for coordination and operation, when appropriate, of statewide educational activities; for state-level review and approval of proposed and
existing academic programs; for the development of recommendations on the level
of support for higher education; for the allocation of appropriated funds to the
various systems; and for annual reporting to the legislature on the performance
of higher education in the state.' '6

162. 1979 AED REPORT, supra note 88 at 170.
163. Id. at 171.
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64

Three separate nine member governing boards would be appointed by the Governor to govern and manage the colleges and
universities. A Board of Visitors would oversee West Virginia University, Marshall University, the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine and the College of Graduate Studies.' 6 A Board
of Governors would be responsible for Bluefield State College, Concord College, Fairmont State College, Glenville StateCollege, Shepherd College, West Liberty State College, West Virginia Institute of
Technology and West Virginia State College. 66 The third governing
body would be a Board of Trustees for Parkersburg Community
College, Southern West Virginia Community College, West Virginia
67
Northern Community College, and their branches.
The state-level coordinating agency recommended by the Academy would have no institutional members, and thus it would be
essentially an independent entity accountable only to the Governor.
The Academy's proposal fails to provide an adequate outlet for the
recognition of institutional concerns. Without direct institutional input and in light of the political nature of the Board, it would be
difficult for the Board of Higher Education to meet the priority of
state-wide planning for higher education.
Perhaps the most serious deficiency in the AED proposal is that
its categorization of the colleges and universities fails to give adequate consideration to the diversity which exists among these institutions. The categorization of institutions recommended by the
Academy is based on the erroneous assumption that the colleges and
universities within each category have similar institutional missions.
For example, under the AED proposal the same Board of Visitors
would attempt to govern West Virginia University, a four-year, land
grant, doctoral-degree granting institution with a research emphasis;
Marshall University, a four-year institution with limited doctoralprograms; the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine, a four-

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.
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year medical school; and the College of Graduate Studies, a small
institution with a limited mission. An attempt to govern these four
institutions with their diverse interests and missions would have a
leveling effect on each institution and would exacerbate the damage
the individual institutions have already incurred under the Board of

Regents .161
C. The Committee on Higher Education Proposal
Perhaps the best alternative is the one originally recommended
by the West Virginia Committee on Higher Education in 1966 and
introduced, but rejected by, the 1969 Legislature in favor of the
consolidated governing board. 169 The Committee on Higher Education proposal (the Committee proposal) would establish a West
Virginia State Board of Education, an eleven member central coordinating body with very limited authority and three separate governing boards.1 70 More specifically, according to this proposal, West
Virginia University and Marshall University would each have a separate nine member Board of Governors with full authority over the
affairs of each institution. 7 1 The remaining state colleges, with their
emphasis on undergraduate education, would be governed by a Board
of Governors of State Colleges.172
Five members of the central coordinating body, which would be
known as the Board of Regents, would be appointed by the Governor. Two members would be representatives of the governing bodies of two private colleges in West Virginia. The presidents of the
West Virginia Board of Education, the Board of Governors of West
Virginia University, the Board of Governors of the State Colleges,

168. The Academy's proposal to create a single Board of Visitors to manage and govern West
Virginia University, Marshall University, and the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine utterly
fails to take into account the different missions of three institutions. In this respect, the recommendation differs little from the consolidated governing board approach of which the Academy was quite
critical, except that it reduces the number of dissimilar institutions grouped in one system.
169. 1966 Corral. REPORT, supra note 32.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 20-21.
172. The West Virginia Committee on Higher Education proposal pre-dates the creation of the
West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine, the several community colleges, and the College of
Graduate Studies.
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and the Board of Governors of Marshall University would serve as
7
the remaining four members. 1
Under this proposal, the West Virginia Board of Regents would
make studies and recommendations relating to higher education; it
would allocate specific functions among the state colleges and universities to avoid unnecessary duplication; it would submit institutional budget requests to the Legislature; and it would allocate federal
funding. In summary, the Board of Regents would serve primarily
as a coordinating body with very limited governance authority over
the individual colleges and universities. 174
The Board of Regents proposed under this alternative would have
the advantage of being less political; only five of its eleven members
would be appointed by the Governor. Moreover, because the presidents of each of the four governing boards would serve as members
of the Board of Regents, the Regents would be more directly accountable to the institutions. Institutions within the system would
have a more effective voice in the coordination of higher education
through their members on the Board of Regents. With the inclusion
of the President of the West Virginia Board of Education and two
representatives of private colleges on the Board of Regents, the interests of the private colleges as well as the interests of the State
Board of Education would be integrated with the concerns of higher
education.
D. An Assessment of the Alternatives
Each of the alternatives discussed above promotes decentralization in the governance of higher education. While the degree and
scope of decentralization would vary with each alternative, the theme
of these proposals is clear: fundamental changes in the current governance structure must be made in order to promote the development
and implementation of a state-wide plan for the future of higher
education in West Virginia and to permit individual institutions to
be more directly and locally governed.
173. Id. at 20.
174. Id.
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This theme is not new. In fact, it was the very message of the
Carnegie Commission's 1959 report on the governance of higher
education in the United States.175 The Commission recommended the
following guiding principles for the governance of institutions of
higher education:
1. Legal autonomy should be given to every institution of higher education that
76
carries on a substantial program of teaching and research.
2. Legislatures are encouraged, when allocating funds to higher education, to
avoid all attempts to legislate specifics of education policy.
3. Legislative interim committees and service agencies should continue their valuable function of keeping legislatures informed, but they should never act as
instruments of control over educational administration.
4. Legislatures should review and revise those statutes pertaining to higher education and fiscal and management controls which have become outmoded or
which impede the effective management of the institution by the responsible officers.'7 7

These principles, enunciated by the Carnegie Commission some thirty
years ago, should guide us in the consideration of an appropriate
governance structure for higher education in West Virginia.
It appears that we have gone full circle in the consideration of
alternatives; it is time to implement a governance structure which,
consistent with these principles, promotes the dual goals of decen78
tralization and institutional autonomy.

175. COnMrTTEE ON GOV'T AND Hiaima EDUCATION, THE EFnimNcY OF FREEDOM (1959).

176. To implement this principle, the committee specifically recommended either a constitutional
amendment or statute that would include the following provisions:
(a) creation of an independent board for a single institution or related groups of institutions;
(b) definition of the manner of selecting governing board members for overlapping terms
of, say, six to nine years; (c) assignment to the board of full responsibility for the expenditure
of funds allocated to the institution and for all internal policies of the institution; (d)
requirement that the board submit full accounts of all financial and academic activities and
be subject to a post-audit of its income and expenditures; (e) prohibition against interference
by any state executive agency with the internal affairs of the institutions.
Id. at 30.
177. Id.at 30-31.
178. In her remarks to the House Education Committee which was studying H.B. 1484, then
acting president of West Virginia University, Diane L. Reinhard, proposed the following five standards
for evaluating an effective system of higher education:
1. It must recognize the diversity of responsibilities carried by the various colleges and
universities, as outlined in official statements of mission.
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A governance model which is most consistent with these principles and which promises the best hope of meeting these goals is

proposed and discussed below. The West Virginia Legislature should
give serious and thoughtful consideration to this proposal which
tracks the coordinating board model but also incorporates some of
the concepts of the consolidated governing board model.

E. A New Alternative: The West Virginia Commission on
Higher Education

This alternative proposes the creation of a five person state-wide
coordinating body, the West Virginia Commission on Higher Ed-

ucation, to replace the existing Board of Regents.

79 Three

separate

and virtually autonomous governing boards would be created as fol-

lows: The Board of Trustees for Marshall University; the Board of
Trustees for West Virginia University; and the Board of College
Trustees for the eight state colleges and the three community col-

leges.

80

The chairs of each of these governing boards would be mem-

2. It sliould be structured to discourage unnecessary program duplication and to encourage
cooperative efforts among institutions. It should therefore include some central academic
program approval authority.
3. It must encourage maximum flexibility with appropriate accountability, in the management of each college or university, in order to ensure effective use of limited financial
resources and enhance the full use of the human talent and energy available at each institution.
4. It should include a structured and participative mechanism for the development of
general plans for the future of higher education in West Virginia.
5. It should provide for effective advocacy on behalf of higher education in general, and
the specific colleges and universities that constitute the systems.
D. Reinhard, Remarks before the House Education Committee (Feb. 4, 1986) (available from this
author upon request).
179. To enhance efforts at coordination, a representative from the State Board of Education
and a representative from the faculty, students and staff could be added to this coordinating body,
as non-voting members.
180. This model anticipates the merger, closure or transfer of the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine and the West Virginia College of Graduate Studies. The proposed Board of College
Trustees is more akin to a consolidated governing board than an institutional governing board because
of the number of institutions it would govern; nevertheless, because the interests of the state colleges
are so similar, a single board of trustees with a focus on undergraduate education can still better
serve the colleges than the existing Board of Regents, which must attempt to accommodate extremely
diverse interests.
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bers of the Commission along with two persons appointed by the
Governor.
The Commission's statutory authority would be expressly limited
to planning for postsecondary education and program review and
assessment of existing programs to avoid unnecessary duplication.
Also included in the Commission's statutory authority would be collection and management of information to be used by the individual
institutions for the development and management of higher education and institutional policies.
The management, governance, and development of educational
policies for individual state institutions would be left to the respective boards of trustees which would be given broad statutory
authority.
As a largely nonpolitical entity, the Commission on Higher Education would have less concern for the political ramifications of
its decisions. The coordinating body would have one priority, planning for postsecondary education in West Virginia. Accordingly, its
attention could be more focused. With a clear and limited statutory
mandate, the Commission could undertake its planning responsibilities with greater vigor, particularly where little or no administrative or governance responsibilities exist to divert its attention.
Moreover, as representatives of individual institutions with vested
interests in the future of higher education in West Virginia, the
majority of the Commission members would have a high stake in
ensuring that the Commission's planning mandate was effectively
fulfilled.
The three autonomous governing boards would provide more
local and direct management of the institutions. These separate institutional governing boards would more effectively accommodate
the diverse missions of the different colleges and universities. Without the pressures of competing and perhaps incompatible institutional interests at a higher, centralized level, the diverse missions
and interests of the individual colleges and universities could flourish
when they were no longer subordinate to the interests of the central
administration.
The more "local" Board of Trustees would be far more responsive to institutional needs. With more access and responsibility
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for decision-making on an institutional level, the faculty, staff and
students at each institution would have a greater opportunity to
influence governance matters. With more accountable institutional
governing boards which provide direct access to faculty, staff, and
students, it is likely that the faculty, staff, and students would no
longer find it necessary to circumvent the institutional decision-making processes by seeking relief from the courts and the Legislature.
Educational policy and decision-making could then be returned to
the colleges and universities.
The multi-tiered administrative process created by the Board of
Regents has often been burdensome, complicated, time-consuming
and unnecessarily controlling. The administrative structure anticipated by this proposal would eliminate that process. Individual governing boards could develop and implement their own administrative
policies and procedures which would serve the missions and specific
needs of a particular college or university. Desirable institutional
differences would be promoted and encouraged.
This model differs from the other alternatives previously discussed in several important ways. First, the state-wide coordinating
body proposed by this model is intended to be more removed from
the political process and more accountable to individual colleges and
universities. By contrast, the entire three member central coordinating council proposed in H.B. 1484 would have been appointed
by the Governor. Under the AED proposal the Governor would have
appointed all eleven members of the West Virginia Board of Higher
Education. In the Committee proposal, the Governor would appoint
seven members of the eleven member, state-wide coordinating body.
In the alternative proposed here, only two members of the five
member central coordinating body would be gubernatorial appointees; the majority of the Commission members would be directly
accountable to the educational community through their institutional
governing boards. By minimizing one aspect of the political influence
over the future of higher education on a state-wide level, this model
places greater reliance on the collective wisdom and judgment of
the providers and consumers of the educational services.
The second important distinction between this alternative and
those previously discussed lies with the authority of the central coordinating body proposed under each alternative.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss1/2
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Under the H.B. 1484 alternative, the coordinating body would
have many of the same statutory responsibilities and duties possessed
by the current Board of Regents. However, the responsibility of
determining the financial and business affairs of each institution
would be transferred to the local governing board which would be
created for each institution.
The AED proposal would make planning the central coordinating
body's first priority, but the West Virginia Board of Higher Education would still be responsible for the allocation of funds throughout the system.
According to the Committee proposal, the central coordinating
body would have both budgetary and planning authority over the
individual institutions. Under the proposal put forth here, the Commission's authority would be quite limited. It would have only the
authority to engage in activities which were directly related to its
statutory planning mandate.
A more critical difference between the alternative proposed here
and those which have been previously proposed is that this model
implicitly accepts (and perhaps promotes) more competition among
the institutions of higher education and their respective governing
boards for increasingly scarce state resources. The competitive environment would inspire some institutions to strengthen their good
programs and eliminate their weak programs in order to survive.
Other institutions or programs might simply fail to survive the competition. The result of the competition, however, would be that institutions and programs would be maintained as a matter of sound
educational policy and planning, and not as a matter of politics.
Certainly, this alternative has the disadvantages which are inherent in any coordinating board structure. 181 Without explicit au181. Under the recently reorganized Maryland higher education system, the new Maryland Higher
Education Commission is given the specific authority to "coordinate the overall growth and development of postsecondary education in the state." Act of May 17, 1988, ch. 246, 1988 MD. 2370 (to
be codified at MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. 11-205(B)(1)). The Commission is further empowered to consult

with the
governing boards and agencies concerned with postsecondary education in the state
[to]. .. consider and evaluate on an ongoing basis the present and future needs for postsecondary education and research throughout the state; the present and future capabilities
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thority to support the implementation of the recommendations which
result from its emphasis on planning for higher education, the Commission would be relatively weak. Without effective coordination
efforts, there could be a proliferation of unnecessary or duplicative
programs. The three governing boards could, without effective coordination, compete for resources to the detriment of the entire higher
education community. However, the scope of the Commission's authority could be expanded, consistent with the guiding principle of
decentralization, to accommodate these concerns.
In addition, under this proposal, the state colleges would likely
argue that their interests are under-represented in the coordinating
board because they, as a group, have only one representative on the
Commission. Students, faculty and staff could similarly argue that
their interests would not be adequately represented on the central
coordinating agency. In fact, however, these interests would be more
directly and more effectively represented on the local governing bodies anticipated in this proposal because they would not be diluted
by the interests of institutions with dissimilar missions. Local governing boards would be given the opportunity to exercise leadership
responsibilities in appropriate areas. This form of governance allows
institutional leaders to emerge and promote the diverse missions of
their institutions. Faculty, staff and students could have a more
significant role in the governance of their institutions.
On balance, this new alternative effectively meets the dual goals
of increased decentralization and institutional autonomy. The role
of the central coordinating body would be carefully delineated to

of the different segments of postsecondary education in the state; the long-range and shortrange objectives and priorities for postsecondary education and methods and guidelines for
achieving and maintaining them; and the appropriate role, function, and mission of each
institution of postsecondary education in the state.
Act of May 17, 1988, ch. 246, 1988 MD. 2370 (to be codified at MD. CoDE ANN. 11-205(b)(2)(1)-

(IV)).
The problem of duplicative or unnecessary expansion in existing or new programs is addressed
by giving the Commission the responsibility and authority to issue certificates of approval or authority
to offer new or modified programs. Act of May 17, 1988, ch. 246, 1988 MD. 2370 (to be codified
at MD. EDUC. CoDE ANN. 11-205(B)(3)). This authority also extends, to a limited degree, to programs
offered by private institutions of higher education. Moreover, the Commission has the statutory authority to direct public institutions to discontinue unreasonably duplicative existing programs. Act of
May 17, 1988, ch. 246, 1988 MD. 2370 (to be codified at MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. 11-305(D)(7)(I).
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ensure that it could accomplish, with adequate support and deference
from the legislature and courts, the mission of state-wide planning
for higher education.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that any proposal which calls for a reform
in the administration of higher education will be controversial. If
the proposals are vigorously debated and if the debate is focused
on solutions, the future of higher education in West Virginia is
promising. On the other hand, if West Virginians avoid the controversy and the difficult decisions which lie at the heart of the
controversy and if political expediency prevents the State from making the difficult decisions which are required when reforms of entrenched institutions are undertaken, the future of higher education
will be dismal indeed.
Clearly, the history of governance in West Virginia has been
bumpy; there is no guarantee that its course will be smoother in the
future. The future of higher education must not be obscured by the
past; nor should it be determined by default. Reforming the system
of higher education in West Virginia will require an enormous effort.
The enormity of the task should not daunt the efforts of those
creative and informed people whose concerned participation can only
lead to improvement.
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